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Abstract 
This paper proposes a model to explain what makes organisations ethically 
vulnerable. Drawing upon legitimacy, institutional, agency and individual moral 
reasoning theories we consider three sets of explanatory factors and examine their 
association with organisational ethical vulnerability. The three sets comprise 
external institutional context, internal corporate governance mechanisms and 
organisational ethical infrastructure. We combine these three sets of factors and 
develop an analytical framework for classifying ethical issues and propose a new 
model of organisational ethical vulnerability. We test our model on a sample of 253 
firms that were involved in ethical misconduct and compare them with a matched 
sample of the same number of firms from 28 different countries. The results suggest 
that weak regulatory environment and internal corporate governance combined with 
profitability warnings or losses in the preceding year increase organisational ethical 
vulnerability. We find counterintuitive evidence suggesting that firms’ involvement 
in bribery and corruption prevention training programmes is positively associated 
with the likelihood of ethical vulnerability. By synthesising insights about 
individual and corporate behaviour from multiple theories, this study extends 
existing analytical literature on business ethics. Our findings have implications for 
firms’ external regulatory settings, corporate governance mechanisms and 
organisational ethical infrastructure. 
Keywords: Organisational ethical vulnerability, corporate governance, business 
ethics, media, compliance, corporate ethics training programmes 
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1. Introduction  
The purpose of this paper is to search for explanations for ethically questionable 
practices that manifest in corporate scandals of various kinds. We look for possible 
internal and external factors to an organisation that may explain corporate 
vulnerability to ethically questionable practices. As a legal entity organisation does 
not have any inherent moral compass to evaluate the consequences of its actions 
from an ethical perspective1. Organisations do not act but people within 
organisations do; hence, while explaining unethical corporate behaviour, the 
individual and collective behaviour of people needs to be acknowledged as a 
potential factor. We argue that ethical choices within organisations are influenced 
by individual values, internal control systems and external institutions. This 
argument is not new and earlier studies provide a descriptive framework for 
classifying ethical issues in business and managerial behaviour (e.g. Carroll, 1978; 
Nash, 1990). Jackson et al.’s (2013) conceptual framework is the closest that 
identifies three factors (individual, organisational and contextual) to explain ethical 
choices in organisations. This conceptual framework recognises that the unit of 
analysis in ethical decision- making is both individual and organisation, but calls 
for empirical research.  
We therefore argue that, although recognising such contractual obligations 
normatively is useful, using this insight for understanding actual corporate conduct 
is not adequate without an analytical framework. This study therefore adds to the 
existing descriptive frameworks of classifying ethical issues by proposing a new 
construct of ‘Organisational Ethical Vulnerability’ (OEV) as an analytical 
framework. We use this framework to seek evidence of three interacting agencies 
of individual, organisation and the system within which organisations operate and 
their impact on the corporate behaviour manifested in corporate scandals. We use 
the word ‘scandal’ in its commonly understood meaning found in the Oxford 
English Dictionary, i.e. “an action or event regarded as morally or legally wrong 
and causing general public outrage”2. Corporate scandal is an event or action that is 
seen as morally or legally wrong and generates negative public reaction, creating 
controversies. 
Corporate scandals are manifestations of unethical behaviour as they mainly mean 
and imply damage to one or more of an organisation’s stakeholders. For example, 
harm done by manipulation of earnings and reporting not only leads to a loss to 
investors but also damages the investors’ trust in financial markets, which increases 
the overall cost of financing in an economy with adverse consequences on 
investment. A US government commissioned report into the causes of the financial 
crisis in 2007-08 concluded that “there was a systematic breakdown in 
accountability and ethics” (GPO-FCIC, 2011, p. xxii). The report identified not only 
individual irresponsibility, but also listed the financial industry’s general 
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acceptance of the erosion of standards. The commission, however, draws attention 
to the wider business environment landscape that let unethical practices in the 
industry continue to a point where the catastrophic crisis became inevitable. The 
report documents that causes should be viewed in the context of “human nature and 
individual and societal responsibility” (GPO-FCIC, 2011, p. xxii). We sympathise 
with this view, which motivates us to look for a framework to analyse this complex 
phenomenon. Our search leads us to consider the role of individuals as managers in 
organisations.  
We therefore take agency theory as a starting point in this research. This theory 
offers a framework to model the behaviour of managers as individuals in relation to 
principals, primarily shareholders in Anglo-American corporations, who entrust the 
managers to manage corporations in the principals’ best interests. Commonly 
attributed reasons for the agency problem are incomplete contracts and information 
asymmetry. The conflict of interest between managers and principals presents an 
ethical dilemma, because managers favour their own interest instead of that of the 
principals and are therefore committing a breach of trust. This is mainly due to the 
information advantage that managers possess over the principals, and, despite the 
terms and conditions of their contracts, they are able to put their own interests first. 
If managers in large organisations have incomplete contracts and have information 
advantage, this may not cause an agency problem; it is the managers’ choice to use 
these two factors as instruments that exacerbates the agency problem. 
At a more fundamental level, we restate the agency problem as an ethical problem 
rather than a contractarian anomaly. An objection to this proposition may be that 
trust is not legally construed as a binding condition in a contract; hence, breach of 
trust is not within the scope of agency theory. The response to such an objection is 
not far from the normal expectations of the fiduciary relationship that managers are 
supposed to have with their principals. The fiduciary duties of managers and boards 
of directors require that the agency relationship is based on trust and confidence. 
Therefore, we restate the agency problem as ethical tension for managers and 
corporate governance mechanisms as a way of mitigating the agency problem. An 
important aspect of this restatement is that it allows us to consider internal corporate 
governance systems as an attempt to deal with ethical problems where the agency 
relation is an instrument through which ethical choice is exercised. 
Institutional theory offers a lens to explore the interaction of organisational 
responses in relation to societal expectations (Chen and Roberts, 2010). This theory 
focuses on the social and other structures and norms external to an organisation to 
which it may conform. The externally focused corporate governance mechanisms 
such as transparent reporting, and compliance with codes and regulations constitute 
a response to the external organisational and institutional environment. Thus, we 
combine individual, organisational and institutional contexts as three agencies that 
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increase or decrease corporations’ vulnerability of ethical conduct. In section two, 
we develop the concept of ethical vulnerability as a function of these three 
interrelated factors. 
We tested our model by developing several hypotheses and found that most factors 
related to internal corporate governance and financial performance, external 
institutional and business context, and organisational ethical infrastructure, are good 
predictors of OEV. The results show that weak regulatory environment and internal 
corporate governance combined with profitability warnings or losses in the 
preceding year increase OEV. We find counterintuitive evidence suggesting that 
training employees on the prevention of corruption and bribery increases OEV. Our 
analytical framework enables us to take a holistic view and analyse a range of 
external and internal factors affecting organisational ethical choices. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops a framework of 
OEV by discussing the role of individual, internal and institutional contexts. In 
section 3, we discuss ethics in light of individuals’ moral judgement and 
institutional theories to develop our hypotheses. This is followed by section 4, 
which describes the methodology, sample and data collection procedures. Section 
5 provides a discussion on the main analysis and results, whilst section 6 concludes 
this paper by summarising the findings and contributions. 
2. The Organisational Ethical Vulnerability (OEV) Framework 
Fraudulent, unethical and illegal corporate behaviour assumes significance beyond 
the breach of agency contract with shareholders, who obviously suffer a loss in 
terms of the market value of their investment. Accounting practices involving 
earnings management are widespread in all sectors, and undermine the reliability of 
financial statements and the confidence of investors in financial markets (Global 
Fraud Study, 2016). Some recent corporate scandals involving major companies 
around the world (e.g. Volkswagen and Mitsubishi’s fuel emission, and Tesco’s 
accounting scandals) illustrate the range of corporate behaviour that undermines 
expected commitment towards transparent and responsible business behaviour. 
These scandals were considered by the market to be shocks and had a devastating 
effect on the market value of the involved companies. The level of market reaction 
to these scandals indicates that shareholders give a great deal of importance to 
business ethics and expect businesses to be ethical. However, attempts to 
theoretically model such corporate behaviour have been fragmented, focusing on 
individuals, or on internal organisational controls or on external factors such as law 
enforcement. We propose to synthesise different theoretical perspectives to develop 
an analytical framework to determine what makes organisations ethically 
vulnerable. 
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We start with a discussion of the concept of ethics and its relation to business 
context. Managers’ individual and ethical decision making are then discussed, 
followed by a discussion of earlier attempts that offered approaches to classify 
ethical issues in relation to the individual, organisation and external environment. 
We add to this strand of literature by proposing an analytical framework outlining 
the expected relationship between the three interacting agencies. In this research 
ethical vulnerability is used in the sense of susceptibility of an organisation to 
unethical behaviour. Such corporate behaviour includes illegal as well as legal but 
ethically questionable activities. We distinguish this from a notion of vulnerability 
found in the literature where one party is seen as vulnerable to another party due to 
power or information advantage (Brown, 2013). Vulnerability of investors to 
managerial behaviour when directors in a corporate business entity fail in their 
fiduciary duties to protect the interests of shareholders is an example of 
vulnerability. This example is articulated in finance literature as the agency 
problem, which is also the rationale underpinning corporate governance codes. We 
argued above that the agency problem can be seen as an ethical issue as it is a breach 
of trust in the principal agent relationship in which information asymmetry and/or 
incomplete contract may be used by an agent as instruments. However, such a 
relationship-based vulnerability is a distinct concept. Organisational ethical 
vulnerability, we propose, is a phenomenon of organisations becoming prone to 
unethical business conduct as manifested through business decisions that violate 
ethical principles. 
Nash (1990, p.5) defines business ethics as “the study of how personal moral norms 
apply to the activities and goals of commercial enterprise. It is not a separate moral 
standard, but the study of how the business context poses its own unique problems 
for a moral person who acts as an agent of this system.” Three areas of managerial 
decision making identified by Nash are choices about what the laws should be and 
whether to follow them; choices about economic and social issues outside the 
domain of law; and choices about the priority of self-interest over the company’s 
interests. This scope of ethical decision making thus encompasses all actions and 
‘all systems involved in the exchange of goods and services’. Schwartz (2016) 
proposes an integrated approach to ethical decision making which is modelled as a 
function of individual moral capacity and situational factors, such as, ethical issues 
on hand, organisational setup (we discuss this below) and personal context, for 
instance, individuals’ personal circumstances, motives, time and financial 
constraints. 
The role of an individual is central to understanding corporate behaviour. Carroll 
(1978) offers a five-level framework to improve ethical behaviour in society, 
namely: individual, organisational, association, societal and international. 
However, while Carroll’s framework is plausible it is not a theoretically grounded 
proposition. To address this issue, we provide theoretical grounding about moral 
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judgement by individuals in section three. Likewise, Matthews et al. (1985) 
developed a framework for classifying ethical issues and levels using three 
categories of ethics: ethics of the person, ethics of the organisation and ethics of the 
system. In this classification, the institutional context comprising the customs, laws 
and values of a region is covered in ethics of the system. Ethics of the organisation 
covers written formal, informal norms and ways of doing business, and the ethics 
of a person category comprises personal values and principles. Nonetheless, this 
normative framework does not lend itself to empirical testing, primarily because, in 
the absence of a clear definition of the three components that could be observed and 
in the absence of a clear statement of how the three components interact, the 
analytical value of this framework is constrained.  Other studies have focused on 
individual choices in simulated scenarios with student participants (e.g. Lopez et 
al., 2009; McDevitt et al., 2007). Along with Jackson et al. (2013), all these studies 
call for empirical research that use an integrated model that could explain ethical 
decision making in organisations. 
From the foregoing discussion, we find that ethics at the individual level are moral 
principles including values that guide an individual’s approach to dealing with 
ethical dilemmas. We also note that, in the case of managers, the organisational 
context – such as codes of conduct – has an impact on the ethical choices and, 
finally, there are external customs, norms and codes. We therefore see this as part 
of a wider set of possible factors that may lead to unethical corporate behaviour. 
Schwartz (2016) calls individual accountability, ethical conduct, and internal 
checks and balances within the organisational environment the situational context 
constituting an ‘ethical infrastructure’. Matthews et al. (1985) call this the ethics of 
the person and ethics of the organisation in their model. The internal organisational 
factors that influence the ethical conduct of a business entity include organisational 
policies such as remuneration policy, whistle blowing, corporate training, rewards 
and punishments for performance targets, codes of conduct, codes of ethics and 
organisational culture (Coffee Jr, 2005). In summary, this set includes 
organisational efforts that enhance the moral capacity of individuals and comprises 
business ethics initiatives and executive skills that affect organisational ethical 
vulnerability. We adapt the ‘ethical infrastructure’ term from the theoretical model 
of an organisation’s ethical effectiveness from Tenbrunsel et al. (2003) and use it 
as the Organisational Ethical Infrastructure (OEI) construct in our proposed 
framework. If a person’s behaviour is reinforced by organisational commitment and 
action to support ethical choices, this may be expected to reduce OEV. 
Internal corporate governance systems – such as, the role of non-executive directors 
and the independence of audit committees – are expected to critically scrutinise 
management decisions and thereby provide a check on unethical practices. 
Executive compensation is viewed as an incentive to manage financial performance 
and could be a potential incentive to indulge in unethical practices such as 
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management of earnings and fraudulent financial reporting practices. Effective 
internal corporate governance is therefore expected to reduce organisational ethical 
vulnerability. We call this set the Internal Corporate Governance and Financial 
Performance (ICGFP). It comprises internal corporate governance mechanisms and 
financial performance context, which is informed by the agency theory propositions 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These factors have been examined in various studies 
as internal corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. Cai et al., 2012; Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013).  
Drawing from institutional theories and the above discussion (also see Schwartz, 
2016; Nash, 1990;  and Carroll, 1978), it is clear that the external institutional and 
business context comprising country-specific quality of regulation, investor 
protection, rule of law, governance and economic development affects OEV. We 
call this External Context and Impact Enablers (ExCItE). The foregoing articulation 
of the potential factors that impact OEV provides analytical schema (Figure 1) that 
we use to test a framework of OEV. We posit that OEV is a function of ExCItE, 
OEI and ICGFP. In this model, we took incidence of corporate scandals as a proxy 
for organisational ethical vulnerability. 
Figure 1: Model of organisational ethical vulnerability 
                            
 
 
 
 
3. Hypotheses development  
Individual approaches to deal with ethical dilemma have been broadly divided into 
two main categories. On the one hand, rationalist approaches assume that 
individuals go through a systematic process of understanding and analysing ethical 
dilemmas, considering the implications of possible responses to such dilemmas and 
then arrive at a moral judgement (Kohlberg, 1973; Schwartz, 2016). On the other 
hand, the intuitionist approach is based on intuition/emotions. The rational process 
guiding individual choices involves factors such as knowledge, values, attitudes and 
intentions as well as organisational reference groups, codes and their enforcement, 
rewards and punishment (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985). Using Kohlberg (1973) 
model to propose a situational interaction process of moral reasoning, Trevino 
(1986) argues that the rationalist process of moral judgement involves interaction 
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between the person’s stage of moral development and the situation, and proposed a 
‘person-situation interactionist’ model of ethical decision-making. This implies that 
ethical decision making is a function of an individual cognitive process that involves 
moral development/capacity/orientation, and its interaction with situational factors. 
Jones (1991) introduced another component by identifying the nature of the ethical 
issue itself as a factor, and argues that the ethical intensity of an issue varies in terms 
of consequences and the nature of those consequences which affects decision 
making. 
The foregoing discussion of the individual ethical decision-making process shows 
that it involves interaction with other organisational actors, processes and policies 
as well as the external context of the business, which all have a bearing on decision 
making. This leads us to consider theories that situate organisations in a wider 
societal context and theorise about organisational conduct by exploring the 
relationship between organisation and society. There are different theoretical 
perspectives that help in understanding the organisation–society relationship. Chen 
and Roberts (2010) discuss four overlapping theories (legitimacy theory, 
institutional theory, resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory) in the 
context of social and environmental accounting research.3 Of particular relevance 
to our study are legitimacy and institutional theories as we seek to establish the 
likely impact of various factors that may prevent unethical practices. 
Organisational legitimacy depends on the perception of wider stakeholders in 
society regarding the congruence of organisational and social goals. It is worth 
noting that an organisation’s legitimacy is conferred by external stakeholders. 
Therefore, organisational response may be guided by the impact of business 
decisions on external stakeholders’ perception about the company. Institutional 
theory argues that, in order to seek legitimation, organisations respond to social, 
legal and traditional institutional structures (Chen and Roberts, 2010). This theory, 
however, differs from legitimacy theory in its scope. While legitimacy of a business 
activity may be questioned by value systems, institutional theory considers the 
established norms, laws and customs that an organisation is expected to follow to 
gain legitimacy. 
We derive a conceptual framework (see Figure 1) for analysing organisational 
ethical vulnerability. This framework is based on the propositions of agency, 
legitimacy and institutional theories, and combines insights from models of 
individual ethical decision making and corporate behaviour. The three constructs 
we propose draw from an integrated model of individual decision making 
(Schwartz, 2016). We argue that considering only individual ethical vulnerability is 
unlikely to offer a good explanation about organisational controversies as there are 
important situational factors within and outside an organisation that are part of an 
individual’s ethical decision-making process. This leads us to propose three 
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overlapping sets of potential factors that may explain OEV. In the following section, 
we organise and discuss relevant literature under these three constructs and develop 
hypotheses accordingly. 
 
External context and impact enablers (ExCItE) 
 
Institutional theory proposes that organisational choices are constrained and guided 
by the social, legal and economic contexts of the countries in which they operate. 
Similarly, under the propositions of legitimacy theory, organisational activities are 
judged on the basis of the value systems of the societies in which they operate. This 
leads us to propose that organisations are expected to conduct their business using 
ethical principles, and comply with the legal and regulatory requirements of the 
countries in which they operate. Hence, by using country-level factors we expect to 
have an enabling impact on ethical business practices. Country-level institutional 
quality and efficient regulatory systems offer significant protections for investors 
and stakeholders. 
The law and finance literature suggests that, as compared to civil law systems, 
common law countries have the strongest protection for investors (La Porta et al., 
1998). Existing literature in this area documents that country-level governance 
factors (e.g. rule of law, regulation quality and government effectiveness) and 
economic indicators (e.g. GDP and per capita income) significantly affect firm-
level governance practices (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). Where country-level 
institutions are weak and firm-level enforcement mechanisms are not strong 
enough, the internal and external control mechanisms would not safeguard the 
interests of shareholders and stakeholders. In a society, where ethical standards are 
high, the ethical expectation of a business will also be high, and, in seeking 
legitimacy, organisations will have to conform to strict ethical standards. In line 
with this, existing evidence suggests that strong external governance mechanisms 
(e.g. legal systems) are complementary mechanisms which define the formal and 
informal guidelines for the board of directors, ownership structure and executive 
compensation (Aguilera et al., 2015). In order to capture the impact of country-level 
regulation, we include regulation quality, strength of investor protection, rule of law 
and government effectiveness as the country-level factors in this study, and apply 
an integrated framework of country-level governance indicators and firm-level 
governance mechanisms to develop the following hypothesis: 
H1: Country-level institutional quality is negatively associated with organisational 
ethical vulnerability. 
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Organisational ethical infrastructure (OEI) 
Organisational ethical infrastructure also affects the ethical decision making of 
individuals, which in turn affects the ethical behaviour of organisations (Craft, 
2013). A corporate ethics programme and initiative covers “the values, policies and 
activities’ that affect firms’ behaviour” (Brenner, 1992, p. 393). It is therefore 
argued that developing a code of ethics and business conduct will not only help in 
promoting ethical behaviour but can also be used as a publicity tool to preserve or 
legitimise corporate actions (Rodriguez-Dominguez et al., 2009). Moreover, in the 
age of technology and excessive availability of information, firms are increasingly 
facing pressures from stakeholders and regulators to develop their own code of 
ethics. The print, electronic and social media are amongst the other sources of 
external disciplinary mechanisms which have recently been proven very effective 
in naming and shaming unethical corporate behaviour (Wang and Ye, 2015). As a 
result, firms are sensitive about their corporate reputation and public image. In the 
event of an actual or potential unethical activity, a vibrant media may drag in the 
top corporate officials from ‘boardroom to courtroom’ and eventually to the 
newsroom (Brickey, 2008). 
In addition, existing literature generally divides a firm’s commitment to business 
ethics into two dimensions, namely: (a) the implicit dimensions and (b) the explicit 
dimensions, where the implicit dimensions include ethical leadership, corporate 
culture and ethical training, and the explicit dimensions include the existence of 
policy manuals, code of ethics, ethics committees and ethics hotlines (Brenner, 
1992; Pae and Choi, 2011). In line with this, Rodriguez-Dominguez et al. (2009) 
argue that local cultures and institutional factors significantly affect the contents of 
ethics codes in different countries. In recent years, many countries have introduced 
an organisational code of ethics and other business conduct-related regulations. As 
a result, large organisations have introduced training programmes that cover 
different aspects of the prevailing ethics regulations. However, the outcome of 
existing empirical research on the effectiveness of ethics codes and business 
conduct is inconclusive (Kaptein and Schwartz, 2008). Discussing the implications 
of ethics codes, Clegg et al. (2007, p.112) assert that codes provide prescriptive 
guidance on differentiating between ‘good’ and ‘wrong’ things, where an individual 
has the responsibility for deciding on one of a number of available choices. 
There is consensus among academics and practitioners that, multinational 
organisations are more vulnerable to issues of business ethics since their operations 
are subject to different regulatory requirements, business practices, social norms, 
values, and cultures. In response to the emergence of anti-corruption/bribery 
regulations following recent business scandals, companies have started providing 
face-to-face and/or online training programmes on the implications of these 
regulations. Clegg et al. (2007) argue that it needs to be empirically investigated 
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how individuals comply/non-comply or ignore and interpret differently certain 
aspects of ethical codes, because full compliance with ethics codes may not 
necessarily prevent unethical activities. In line with this, some organisations have 
taken a more principles-based approach by voluntarily adopting measures to 
improve business ethics in their operations (such as developing policies on whistle-
blower protection, providing ombudsman services, establishing hotlines for 
reporting questionable activities, etc.). Therefore, consistent with the findings of 
Pae and Choi (2011), we argue that training initiatives and explicit commitment to 
business ethics will promote ethical behaviour in organisations, and hypothesise 
that: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between organisational ethical infrastructure 
and organisational ethical vulnerability. 
Internal corporate governance and financial performance (ICGFP) 
 
Non-executive directors and independence of audit committees  
 
According to agency theory, the appointment of non-executive directors enhances 
board-level monitoring and oversight in companies (Jensen, 1993). The presence of 
non-executive directors (NEDs) on corporate boards has been linked with a number 
of key functions in the existing literature. First, NEDs help in monitoring 
management actions on behalf of shareholders; second, they provide strategic 
advice on key business decisions; and, third, they bring resources to their companies 
(Fama, 1980). In line with this, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) argue that NEDs 
bring independent judgement to the board. Consequently, many studies have 
investigated the impact of NEDs on various organisational outcomes such as 
financial performance (e.g. Singh et al., 2017), risk disclosure (Ntim and 
Soobaroyen, 2013) and the survival of firms during difficult economic times 
(Mangena et al., 2012). 
There is also evidence in the existing literature which suggests that increasing the 
percentage of NEDs on corporate boards and audit committees decrease a firm’s 
probability of restating its financial statements (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005) and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud (Uzun et al., 2004). Similarly, Chen et al. (2006) 
document that a higher ratio of NEDs is associated with lower incidence of fraud in 
Chinese organisations. Likewise, in a cross-country analysis of 760 firms, García-
Sánchez et al. (2015) find that the presence of independent directors on corporate 
boards successfully promotes the implementation of ethical codes of conduct in 
organisations. 
The importance of independent NEDs could also be explained by the fact that the 
majority of corporate governance codes around the world now require companies 
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to appoint a specific number of non-executive directors to their boards. In light of 
the above discussions and based on the assumptions of agency theory, we argue that 
firms with a higher percentage of NEDs on their corporate boards and audit 
committees are less likely to be ethically vulnerable. In line with this, the following 
research hypotheses are proposed: 
H3: There is a negative relationship between board independence and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
H4: There is a negative relationship between audit committee independence and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
Board Size 
Board size is an important factor that has been associated with various 
organisational outcomes. When a corporate board becomes larger, coordination 
among members becomes difficult, and thus it becomes dysfunctional and less 
effective (Jensen, 1993). In contrast, members of smaller boards are more likely to 
work as a team, which leads to better decision making (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). 
While employing the agency theory framework, most of the published studies in 
this area show a negative relationship between board size and various measures of 
firm performance (Adams and Jiang, 2017; Yermack, 1996). Other studies that 
follow the same theoretical framework have examined board size and its association 
with other organisational outcomes, such as the probability of restatement of 
companies’ financial statements (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005) and the incidence of 
corporate fraud (Chen et al., 2006). The findings of most of these studies regard 
board size as an important element in organisational outcomes. 
In relation to ethical responsibilities, García-Sánchez et al. (2015) argue that a board 
size of more than 15 members may lead to a less optimal monitoring process, which 
may affect a firm’s commitment to business ethics. It is therefore argued that, if 
larger boards are not playing an active role in maintaining business ethics, and are 
also less effective in the monitoring and decision-making processes, then companies 
with larger boards are more likely to be involved in corporate scandals. Hence, we 
hypothesise that: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between board size and organisational ethical 
vulnerability. 
Gender Diversity 
Gender diversity on corporate boards is another important governance mechanism 
which has received considerable attention in recent years. Several countries in 
Europe (e.g. France, Germany and Norway) have already implemented a fixed 
quota for female directors on corporate boards. Support for gender diversity on 
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boards is also strengthened by the findings of existing corporate governance 
literature. In particular, evidence in the existing literature has shown a positive 
relationship between gender diversity and various organisational outcomes, such as 
firm performance (Post and Byron, 2015), firm reputation (Musteen et al., 2010), 
success in mergers and acquisitions (Ben-Amar et al., 2013), CEO turnover (Elsaid 
and Ursel, 2017) and CSR performance (Boulouta, 2013; Harrigan, 1981). 
It has also been documented in the existing literature that male and female directors’ 
ethical perception is significantly different (Ibrahim et al., 2009), and, as compared 
to men, female directors have higher sensitivity towards ethical issues in business 
operations (Simga-Mugan et al., 2005). For instance, women tend to see 
questionable business practices as more unethical than men do and try to avoid such 
practices (Deshpande et al., 2000). We therefore argue that companies with gender 
diversity on their boards will be less vulnerable to ethics-related incidents, and 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H6: There is a negative relationship between board gender diversity and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
Executive compensation 
In order to control the opportunistic behaviour of directors and align their interests 
with those of the shareholders, firms can use performance-based compensation 
schemes (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, performance-based compensation 
schemes can lead to short-termism, which is regarded as the downside of such 
schemes and can create further agency problems (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Van 
Yperen et al. (2011) argue that increasing the emphasis on goal achievement 
encourages unethical behaviour among individuals, and it is therefore expected that 
performance-based compensation would encourage boards of directors to become 
involved in unethical practices. In line with this, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) 
show that companies where the CEO’s overall compensation is sensitive to 
company share prices are involved in a higher level of earnings management 
practices. Similarly, other studies show a positive association between stock-option-
based compensation and the likelihood of fraud (Denis et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
recent evidence in the existing literature shows that firms select weak performing 
peers to set CEO performance-based pay (Skovoroda and Bruce, 2017), which 
could indicate unethical business practice. It is therefore argued that senior 
executive compensation might encourage directors to try and achieve the target 
performance measure(s) irrespective of the ethical consequences of their decisions, 
which could lead to business ethics-related scandals. As a consequence, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
H7: There is a positive relationship between senior executives’ compensation and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
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Number of board meetings 
Another widely used corporate governance mechanism in the existing governance 
research is board activity, which is generally measured as the number of board 
meetings during an organisation’s reporting period. From an agency theory 
perspective, increasing the number of board meetings may signal increased 
vigilance and monitoring at the top. However, while investigating the relationship 
between board activities and firm performance, Vafeas (1999) documents that board 
activities are likely to increase following poor financial performance in the 
preceding year. Similarly, Brick and Chidambaran (2010) argue that external 
market pressures originating from a firm’s financial distress may significantly 
influence the firm’s management to change its governance arrangements (e.g. 
increasing board meetings). In the context of corporate scandals, one argument is 
that increasing board meetings would enhance a firm’s monitoring and thus 
minimise the likelihood of corporate scandals. A counter argument, however, 
suggests that, following the publication of a firm’s corporate scandal in the media, 
the number of its board meetings may increase. In line with this, Chen et al. (2006) 
show a positive relationship between the number of board meetings and the 
likelihood of accounting scandals for Chinese listed companies. We therefore argue 
that an increase in the number of board meetings would indicate organisational 
ethical vulnerability, and propose the following hypothesis: 
H8: There is a positive relationship between number of board meetings and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
Single largest shareholder (Blockholder) 
Ownership structure varies across organisations and plays a significant role in their 
corporate governance mechanisms. Existing studies on ownership structure are 
generally based on the theoretical proposition of Shleifer and Vishny (1986), who 
argue that a concentrated ownership system is a superior control mechanism as 
compared to a dispersed ownership system. However, Chen et al. (2006) argue that 
in a concentrated ownership structure blockholders may have the incentive to either 
deter fraud or to engage in unethical activities and expropriate the rights of minority 
shareholders. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 758) report that large 
investors could use their shareholding rights and redistribute wealth in both efficient 
and inefficient ways for their self-interest. While investigating the ownership 
characteristics of the largest corporate scandals in the USA and Europe, Coffee Jr 
(2005) documents that, as compared to concentrated ownership systems, dispersed 
ownership systems are more vulnerable to different forms of fraud and earnings 
management practices.  
Accordingly, we argue that corporate scandals arise as a result of poor monitoring 
and governance, and the ownership structure of firms plays a significant role in 
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organisational frauds. We therefore predict that firms that had no scandals are more 
likely to be owned by large blockholders. Consistent with prior international 
comparative literature on ownership structure (Thomsen et al., 2006), we use a 
threshold of five percent or more to include a proxy for the single largest 
blockholder, and propose that: 
H9: There is a negative relationship between blockholders’ ownership and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
Financial factors 
The financial health of a firm plays a vital role in its underlying business and ethical 
behaviour. Several studies have examined the financial characteristics of firms 
which received adverse rulings from the Financial Reporting Review Panel in the 
UK (Peasnell et al., 2001); restated their accounting earnings (Agrawal and Chadha, 
2005); have been engaged in accounting frauds (Chen et al., 2006); or have been 
prosecuted for committing financial frauds (Misangyi and Acharya, 2014). The 
findings of these and other published studies in this area suggest that managers are 
likely to engage in earning restatement or financial fraud following a firm’s poor 
financial performance (measured by low growth, losses, poor stock performance, 
etc.). Other studies, such as Barraquier (2011), also confirm that profit-orientation, 
external market pressures and ‘financial capacities’ in a competitive environment 
may restrain managerial ethical behaviour. It is therefore argued that poor financial 
performance may lead to short-termism and subsequently motivates managers to 
engage in unethical activities. We include three proxies for poor financial 
performance, namely: profit warnings in the preceding year, profit warnings during 
the defect year (year in which the company had a scandal), and losses in the defect 
year, and hypothesise that: 
H10: There is a positive relationship between poor financial performance and 
organisational ethical vulnerability. 
Table 1 presents a summary of all our hypotheses and relates them to their 
theoretical aspiration and expected results. 
 
Table 1 Summary of hypotheses 
OEV factors Theoretical inspiration Hypotheses Expected effect 
on OEV 
ExCItE Institutional theories: Firms will 
follow the norms and respond to 
external institutions 
H1 Decrease (–) 
OEI Moral development, ethical 
decision making 
H2 Decrease (–) 
ICGFP Agency theory H3, H4, H6, H9 Decrease (–) 
    H5, H7, H8, H10 Increase  (+) 
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4. Data, sample and methodology 
This study investigates whether ExCItE, OEI, and ICGFP affect OEV. Following 
the methodology of Peasnell et al. (2001), we take a sample of firms having 
corporate scandals in recent years, and compare it with a control sample of firms 
that did not face any scandal. The analysis is conducted in two different ways. 
Firstly, in order to investigate any significant differences between the two samples 
in terms of ExCItE, OEI, and ICGFP, we perform a univariate analysis. Secondly, 
to investigate the factors that might determine OEV in the sample organisations, we 
carry out a multivariate analysis. We collect data from Datastream for a sample of 
253 companies that had scandals published in the media from 28 different 
countries.4 Table 2 shows details of the sample companies from different 
countries/industries. The largest number of scandals was recorded in the USA, as 
255, from 120 companies and 30 different industries, followed by the UK, 
constituting 46 scandals, from 25 companies. Table 2 includes the costs associated 
with corporate scandals in each country, which is measured as actual or estimated 
penalties resulting from the lost court cases, settlements or cases not yet settled. 
These scandals are linked to business ethics in general, and political inducement or 
bribery and corruption in particular. The monetary costs arising from these scandals 
are over $45 billion in one year for our sample. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Our econometric specification requires the creation of a control sample that is not 
subject to any scandal. Details of our sample selection procedures are explained in 
Table 3 below. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We employ the following probit regression model as our dependent variable is a 
binary outcome. We have chosen our sample firms through the application of a 
number of matching criteria, such as firm size, industry and country. Due to the 
nature of this study, we regard this model as the most appropriate method for this 
investigation. 
𝑂𝐸𝑉 = 𝑓(𝐸𝑥𝐶𝐼𝑡𝑒, 𝑂𝐸𝐼, 𝐼𝐶𝐺𝐹𝑃, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠) 
Table 4 provides definitions of all the variables in the above model. OEV is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a company has a scandal and 0 otherwise. 
A company having more than one scandal also takes the value of 1 in our probit 
analysis. The explanatory variables are: ExCItE, OEI, and ICGFP. We also control 
for leverage (LEVER), market-to-book value (MTBV) and duality (DUAL). DUAL 
takes the value of 1 if chairman and CEO are the same person and 0 otherwise. In 
addition, we collected the World Bank country-level data on rule of law, regulation 
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quality, government effectiveness, strength of investors’ protection and per capita 
GDP for each country in our sample. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 shows details of the industrial classifications of the sample firms, where the 
largest number constituting 44 firms belong to the banking industry, followed by 
23 firms from the insurance sector, 17 firms from the oil and gas sector, and 15 
firms from the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sector. This implies the sensitivity 
of specific industrial sectors, which is evidenced by the highest number of incidents 
in these industries. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5. Analysis and Results  
Univariate analysis 
The results of our univariate analysis are reported in Table 6. In terms of ICGFP, 
the results show that firms that face OEV issues have significantly larger board size 
as compared with firms in the control sample. This is consistent with the view that 
larger boards are less effective in monitoring and are also less likely to fulfil their 
ethical commitments. In addition, as compared with firms in the control sample, all 
those firms that had some kind of OEV pay significantly higher compensation to 
their directors. This is in accord with the assumption that higher compensation can 
lead to short-termism. Paying higher compensation to executives could lead to a 
greater emphasis on goal achievement, whereby executives will pursue 
organisational objectives that could lead to wealth maximisations for shareholders, 
but may not necessarily demonstrate a better ethical performance. Contrary to our 
expectations, the outcome of our univariate analysis suggests that firms that had 
OEV had more independent boards and had higher gender diversity on their boards. 
We therefore could not find support for the hypotheses that suggest that board 
independence and gender diversity are negatively associated with OEV. In terms of 
the audit committee independence, we did not find any significant differences 
between firms that had OEV and those of the control sample. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
The results also suggest that, as compared to firms in the control sample, firms that 
had OEV had a significantly higher number of board meetings. This is in line with 
the notion that a board of directors is subject to extensive pressures after the 
appearance of the news of their firm’s unethical activities in media. The percentage 
of shares owned by the single biggest owners (SBO) is significantly higher for the 
control sample, which supports the assumption that large shareholders exercise 
significant monitoring and control, and their presence minimises the likelihood of 
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OEV. Interestingly, and contrary to our expectations, firms having OEV have 
significantly higher commitments to business ethics. This raises some concerns 
about the effectiveness of corporate ethics programmes. In addition, the univariate 
analysis results also suggest that a significantly higher percentage of firms that had 
OEV had reported losses in the defect year and/or had issued profit warnings before 
the year of scandal. 
Multivariate analysis 
The results of our correlation analysis are reported in Table 7. As highlighted in 
Table 7, the highest correlation coefficient is 0.43, which is much lower than the 
recommended threshold of 0.80 (Field, 2009). In addition, we have also carried out 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test for all variables, which is generally regarded 
as a way of quantifying multi-collinearity in regression models. This analysis 
resulted in VIF values of less than 3 for all our variables, which suggests no multi-
collinearity among the explanatory variables of this study. On the basis of the results 
of the correlation and VIF analysis, we argue that multi-collinearity is not a cause 
of concern in our analyses. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
In order to examine the effects of ExCItE, OEI, and ICGFP on the likelihood of 
OEV, we estimate a series of probit regressions, the results of which are reported in 
Table 8. The dependent variable in all probit regression models takes the value of 1 
if a firm has a scandal and 0 otherwise. The results of all these analyses are discussed 
below. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
The first set of factors in our model that could determine OEV is ExCItE. The results 
show that the relationship between the quality of a country’s legal system 
(represented by regulation quality and rule of law) and OEV is significantly 
negative. This implies that in a strong legal jurisdiction it is less likely that 
businesses will engage in unethical business practices. Two other country-level 
factors, GDP and government effectiveness, are also significantly negatively 
associated with OEV. The relationship between the strength of the investor 
protection index and OEV is also negative, but this relationship is statistically 
insignificant. In line with institutional and legitimacy theories, these results imply 
that strong legal systems and greater protection for shareholders’ rights are 
important factors in the determination of OEV in different jurisdictions. 
Another key determinant of OEV in our framework is OEI. With regard to OEI, we 
find a significantly positive association between bribery and corruption training 
(BCT) and OEV. This indicates that a significantly higher percentage of sample 
firms that allegedly engaged in unethical activities publicly disclose their 
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commitment to business ethics programmes – as evidenced by a higher percentage 
of bribery and corruption training programmes by firms involved in unethical 
activities. This is consistent with the findings of Kaptein and Schwartz (2008), 
which report a weak or no significant impact of the corporate ethics programmes. 
This finding raises concerns about the effectiveness of corporate ethics programmes 
adopted by firms and questions the content of the programmes used by 
organisations. However, in relation to ethics-related training programmes, the 
available data do not give details about the providers of the training programmes, 
which may also have implications for these findings. We therefore recommend the 
application of independent and externally evaluated ethical assessments on an 
annual basis for all firms that could ensure the effectiveness of corporate ethics-
related training programmes which may be different in content for different 
organisations. 
With regard to ICGFP variables, the results reported in Table 8 show that board size 
is significantly positively associated with OEV. This result supports H5, which 
hypothesises a positive relationship between board size and OEV. This is consistent 
with the findings of García-Sánchez et al. (2015) which suggest that larger boards 
are less likely to fulfil their ethical commitments. As larger boards are difficult to 
coordinate and are less effective in monitoring, firms with larger boards are less 
likely to carefully scrutinise the ethical implications of various business decisions. 
Consequently, firms with larger boards are more likely to be ethically vulnerable. 
The results in Table 8 also indicate that board independence, audit committee 
independence and gender diversity are negatively associated with OEV. However, 
these results are statistically insignificant, which provides only partial support for 
hypotheses H3, H4 and H6. The negative coefficient for single blockholder 
ownership and OEV confirms H9, suggesting that large blockholders exercise a 
significant monitoring role in reducing the likelihood of OEV. The results also show 
total senior executive compensation (TSEC) as significantly positively associated 
with OEV, which thus supports H7. This finding supports the view that managerial 
incentives can lead to short-termism (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). In addition, 
Benson and Davidson (2010) argue that executives are compensated for achieving 
the shareholders’ value maximisation goal but not necessarily for having good 
relationships with the firm’s stakeholders. Similarly, higher executive 
compensation could also encourage directors to be more focused on achieving 
certain targets. In this regard, existing evidence suggests that imposing achievement 
goals on individuals positively affects their unethical behaviour (Van Yperen et al., 
2011). We therefore argue that higher compensation could encourage executives to 
pursue strategies that would lead to increases in shareholders’ wealth and the 
meeting of certain targets, irrespective of considering their ethical implications. As 
a consequence, offering higher compensation to executives would increase OEV. 
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The number of board meetings (NBM) is significantly positively associated with 
OEV. This implies that the boards of directors are likely to meet more frequently 
when the media reports negative news about their firms. This is consistent with the 
findings of Chen et al. (2006), who report a significantly positive association 
between the number of board meetings and the likelihood of accounting scandals 
for Chinese companies. In the context of OEV, we argue that these meetings are 
generally held to discuss the circumstances affecting corporate reputation after a 
scandal and/or to discuss the future line of action for an organisation. Consistent 
with the results reported in the univariate analysis, we find a significantly negative 
relationship between the share ownership of single largest shareholders and OEV, 
which implies the strong monitoring role of large shareholders in organisations. 
In terms of financial performance, we find a significantly positive relationship 
between profit warnings issued in the year before the scandal (PW12) and OEV in 
the subsequent year. In Model 2, we include another measure of poor financial 
performance, measured by a dummy variable, PW13, which takes the value of 1 if 
a firm has issued profit warning during the defect year and 0 otherwise. The 
relationship between profit warnings in the defect year and OEV is weakly 
significant. Similarly, in Model 3, we include a measure for poor financial 
performance, represented by LOSS, which takes the value of 1 if a firm has reported 
losses and 0 otherwise. The relationship between LOSS and OEV is significant at 
the 10 percent level, suggesting that poor financial performance may trigger 
earnings restatement and accounting frauds. In light of all these findings, we argue 
that regulatory bodies should maintain a continuous surveillance of firms reporting 
losses and firms that issue profit warnings. 
As discussed earlier we have included a number of interactions between various 
firm-level and country-level factors in our analysis (see models 6–10). Our results 
show that the interaction between bribery and corruption training and regulation 
quality is significantly positively associated with OEV. This would imply that, in 
those countries where regulation is strong, companies will offer more bribery and 
corruption training programmes to meet institutional requirements and gain 
legitimacy. However, such trainings may not be effective in stopping businesses 
from carrying out unethical activities. Perhaps companies may be using these 
training programmes as a box-ticking exercise to meet certain regulatory 
requirements rather than implementing processes that could prevent unethical 
activities. This provides further explanation for the positive relationship between 
bribery and corruption training programmes and OEV. 
Robustness tests 
Concerns have been raised in the existing literature regarding econometric 
specifications which fail to control for the issues arising from endogeneity (Wintoki 
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et al., 2012). We use the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test of endogeneity and identify 
board size as an endogenous variable. As we employ cross-sectional data in this 
investigation, we use instrumental variables (IV) to control for endogeneity, which 
is a commonly used method for dealing with endogeneity problems in accounting 
research. In order to use a variable as an instrument, it needs to be highly correlated 
with the endogenous explanatory variable but should not be correlated with the error 
term (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010, p.186). Instrumental variable firm size (measured 
by logarithm of total assets) is highly correlated with board size, and it is unlikely 
that it can affect OEV through the error term. We therefore use firm size as an 
instrument for board size. The results from the IV-probit estimation are reported in 
Table 9, which indicates that the results are unchanged after controlling for 
endogeneity. In further exploring the economic significance of the regression 
coefficients, we also calculate marginal effect as we have used probit estimations. 
The marginal effect measures the probability of sample firms engaging in unethical 
activities. The results show that a one-unit change in profit warnings in the 
preceding year (PW12) increases the probability of OEV by 19%. Similarly, the 
implied probability of OEV increases by a factor of 0.13 for firms providing bribery 
and corruption training programmes (BCT). Finally, the results from the Wald test 
are also insignificant, which confirms that endogeneity is not affecting our results 
and that our regular probit regression results reported in Table 8 are robust. 
 [Insert Table 9 about here] 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This research enhances our understanding of various firm-level and contextual 
factors that could determine the ethical vulnerability of organisations in different 
countries. We examine whether OEV arises as a result of a vacuum in organisational 
ethical infrastructure, corporate governance arrangements, country-level contextual 
factors or poor financial performance. We combine individual, organisational and 
institutional context as the three agencies that increase or decrease organisational 
ethical vulnerability. 
We find that certain board characteristics are associated with OEV. For instance, 
firms with larger boards are more likely to be ethically vulnerable. This finding 
suggests that larger boards are more complex, difficult to coordinate and less 
effective in monitoring (Jensen, 1993). Therefore, larger boards may not be 
carefully scrutinising the ethical implications of various corporate decisions. This 
finding supports the arguments in the existing governance literature that call for 
limiting corporate board size to seven or eight members (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) 
or 15 members (García-Sánchez et al., 2015). 
In relation to board activity in the defect year, our findings show a significantly 
positive association between the number of board meetings and OEV. This suggests 
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that board activities are likely to increase during the year of corporate scandals and 
that corporate response to scandals (evidenced by the number of board meetings 
during the defect year) is generally reactive. Under the contemporary disclosure 
practices in most countries, companies only report the number of board meetings in 
their annual reports and do not show details of issues discussed in those meetings. 
The outcome of our findings suggests that companies may be asked to report 
precisely how often business ethics-related actions are considered in their board 
meetings. We therefore argue that the inclusion of details about ethics-related 
actions in corporate board meetings will allow regulators and other stakeholders to 
proactively monitor corporate board activities, which might help in minimising 
OEV.  
Another key finding of the study is related to firm-level corporate governance 
mechanisms, which indicates that higher senior executive compensation increases 
OEV. From the agency theory perspective, paying higher compensation to 
executives might help to align their interests with those of the shareholders. 
However, the framework of enlightened value maximisation suggests that 
shareholders’ wealth maximisation is not the only priority of a firm and regards 
other stakeholders as the firm’s strategic partners (Jensen, 2002). Our findings 
suggest that, although compensation may be an effective tool to encourage 
executives to achieve certain financial goals, it often fails to encourage them to 
achieve the organisation’s ethical objectives. As performance-based pay is a key 
requirement of various corporate governance codes, this finding supports the view 
that strict reliance on aggressive financial goals encourages unethical corporate 
behaviour (Van Yperen et al., 2011). This finding has implications for regulators 
and practitioners, suggesting that the achievement of certain ethical performance 
measures could be incorporated in the existing annual targets for senior executives, 
which could encourage executives to make ethical considerations an integral part of 
their corporate strategy. 
The economic implications of our findings are also significant. We show that the 
financial costs (fines and penalties) relating to OEV are more than $45 billion for a 
sample of 253 firms in just one year. This is a huge amount and has significant 
implications for not only the shareholders but also other stakeholders. Companies 
pass on these costs to their customers, which negatively affect various stakeholders. 
We observe the existence of a high number of bribery and corruption training 
programmes in firms that have experienced ethical vulnerability. These findings 
thus raise questions about the effectiveness of corporate ethics training programmes 
and show that commitment to business ethics may not necessarily decrease OEV.  
The findings of this paper identify poor financial performance as one of the key 
determinants of OEV. Firms issuing profit warnings or reporting losses in the 
preceding/current year are more likely to exhibit OEV. This suggests that poor 
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financial performance may lead to short-termism and a panic response at the cost 
of careful consideration of the governance and ethical matters, making 
organisations vulnerable to corporate scandals and controversies. When firms 
become excessively sensitive to short-term forecasts, responses to financial analysts 
may trigger an intuitive rather than a rational decision-making. We argue that poor 
financial performance increases OEV, and in order to mitigate this risk, responsible 
boards may review the sources of pressures or incentives created by rewards and 
performance management systems in their organisations. Therefore, regulatory 
bodies should develop a surveillance system which may issue early warnings about 
firms that are poorly performing in financial terms, and argue that such a proactive 
approach may help in minimising OEV. Our findings also imply that full 
compliance with governance regulations and codes of ethics could often provide 
misleading signals. For instance, fully compliant firms may not easily get caught in 
the regulatory surveillance system and that compliance could be used as an 
impression management or legitimacy tool to improve corporate image. 
With regard to external context and organisational ethical infrastructure, our results 
suggest that country-level institutional factors are important determinants of OEV. 
It is generally expected that companies operating in countries with a strong rule of 
law, good-quality regulation, effective government infrastructure and strong GDP 
are less likely to be ethically vulnerable. However, the occurrence of some recent 
scandals in developed economies contradicts this perception. Our findings suggest 
that, although the quality of regulation and rule of law affect the effectiveness of 
organisational ethical infrastructure in different countries, organisations should also 
give attention to several other factors. In those countries where is rule of law, 
companies may offer more ethics-related training programmes to their employees. 
The training programmes are although intended to meet certain regulatory 
requirements, the real motive of firms behind such programmes may not necessarily 
be related to business ethics. This provides further explanation for the positive 
relationship between bribery and corruption-related training programmes and OEV. 
These findings have implications for practitioners and policy makers. We regard 
business ethics as an important element of a firm’s strategy and ask for certain 
refinements in the regulatory structure regarding the ethical awareness in firms and 
the structure and content of ethics-related training programmes. Why do executives 
become involved in unethical behaviour, which may result in substantial losses for 
firms in the long run? Various internal and external situational factors which may 
influence ethical choices made by executives have been examined in this research. 
However, further insights can be gained by direct examination of individual 
behaviour in situational context that our study has proposed. In addition, at firm-
level, the structure of ethics-related training programmes and details of who is 
delivering those programmes would need detailed scrutiny. For instance, the 
contents of an ethics-related training programme provided by a professional 
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accountancy firm would be different than that offered by a management consulting 
firm, as the former may focus more extensively on complex accounting and tax-
related ethical issues, while the latter may provide a more holistic overview of 
business ethics in the corporate world. In this way, the quality of such training 
programmes could then be linked with OEV in a more meaningful way to 
understand their effectiveness.  
More broadly, this study has shown that individual and organisational ethical 
decisions are inter-related in real life and that only partial understanding can be 
obtained from studying just the financial effects of ethical, social or environmental 
reporting. Further research is needed to validate the strength of these inter-
relationships between external, internal and individual factors that could make an 
organisation ethically vulnerable. Future studies may also explore changes in a 
firm’s corporate governance structure (e.g. board size, composition and ownership 
structure) and market reactions subsequent to scandals to understand the quality of 
external oversight. Finally, our model of OEV could be applied in an 
interdisciplinary context, particularly when examining scandals in the areas of 
accounting, finance, marketing, human resource management, and logistics and 
supply chain management. 
Despite the substantial contributions of this paper, the findings are subject to 
limitations. First, the cross-sectional nature of our data does not allow us to capture 
variations in firm-specific governance and financial characteristics after the 
scandals. Second, the role of firm-level risk management committees could have 
significant implications for OEV. Owing to the unavailability of such data for our 
cross-national sample, we are unable to capture such impact in our research. Finally, 
when confronted with an ethical dilemma, a board of director may conduct a cost-
benefit analysis, which may lead to the adoption of strategies that are profitable, yet 
unethical. However, investigating this aspect is not possible from our data and is 
therefore left to future research. 
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Table 2 Sample characteristics     
Countries 
No. of 
Industries 
No. of 
Companies 
No. of 
Scandals 
% of scandals 
in each country 
Costs of Corporate 
scandals ($ 
millions) 
Cost in each 
country as a % 
of total cost 
Australia 4 9 13 2.863% 30.98 0.068% 
Belgium 1 1 2 0.441% 3.25 0.007% 
Brazil 1 1 1 0.220% NA NA 
Canada 8 10 11 2.423% 336.14 0.743% 
China 3 4 7 1.542% 8.27 0.018% 
Denmark 2 2 2 0.441% NA NA 
France 9 10 15 3.304% 412.53 0.911% 
Germany  8 11 20 4.405% 1984.93 4.385% 
Greece 1 1 1 0.220% 0.09 0.000% 
Hong Kong 2 2 5 1.101% 249.00 0.550% 
India 5 7 10 2.203% 1110.40 2.453% 
Ireland 1 1 1 0.220% 0.12 0.000% 
Israel 2 2 2 0.441% 1.65 0.004% 
Italy 5 5 6 1.322% 0.78 0.002% 
Japan 4 5 5 1.101% 632.94 1.398% 
Malaysia 2 2 2 0.441% NA NA 
Mexico 2 2 2 0.441% 10.76 0.024% 
Netherlands 6 6 7 1.542% 26.34 0.058% 
Norway 2 2 2 0.441% 16.48 0.036% 
Russia 1 1 2 0.441% 88.92 0.196% 
South Africa 4 4 4 0.881% 32.79 0.072% 
South Korea 5 8 9 1.982% 0.00 0.000% 
Spain 1 1 1 0.220% NA NA 
Sweden 3 3 5 1.101% 9.26 0.020% 
Switzerland 5 6 16 3.524% 435.31 0.962% 
Thailand  2 2 2 0.441% 1.27 0.003% 
United 
Kingdom 12 25 46 10.132% 3093.48 6.834% 
United States 30 120 255 56.167% 36782.99 81.255% 
Total 131 253 454 100% 45268.69 100% 
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Table 3 Panel A – Sample selection criteria  
Step 1: We searched for those companies having scandals published in media from a total of 3,898 companies in the 
Datastream 'Asset4 Universe' between 2002 and 2015.  
 
 
Step 2: We identified 520 firms having scandals published in media from a total of 3,898 companies  
 
 520 
 
Step 3: We excluded 200 firms that were accused by media but were not yet penalised by any court of law/regulatory body or 
where no case was initiated by a court of law  
 
(200) 
Initial sample 
 
 
 320 
  
 
Step 4: A corresponding control firm was chosen from the same industry and country. Following Peasnell, Pope and Young 
(2001), the total assets of a matched (control) firm should be in the range of ± 25% of the total assets of a defect firm which 
resulted in the deletion of 67 firms from the sample [as those firms did not fulfil the matching criterion]. 
 
  (67) 
Step 5: Our final sample comprises 253 firms from 28 countries for the year 2013. The year 2013 was chosen as the sample 
year, because the highest number of corporate scandals have been reported during this year. 
 
 
 
 
 
253 
 
Panel B – Firm Size* 
Variable Firms having scandals Control sample p-value for difference 
Market-to-book value (MTBV) 2.10232 2.239167 0.8171 
A paired sample t-test is used to evaluate the differences in means for the market-to-book value of equity for firms having scandals and for the 
control sample. 
*Firm Size is measured as the market-to-book value of equity.  
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Table 4 Definition of variables   
Variables  Definition 
Source/Datastream 
Code 
Organisational Ethical Vulnerability 
(OEV) 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a company has a 
scandal published in the media linked to business ethics in general, 
political contributions or bribery and corruption, otherwise 0. 
SOCODP058 
External Context and Impact Enablers (ExCItE) 
 
Regulation quality (REGQUA) The index measures how governments formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. 
World Bank indicator 
Strength of investor protection index 
(SIPI) 
This index is an average of three indices: the extent of disclosure 
index, the extent of director liability index, and the ease of 
shareholder suit index. The index ranges from 0 (little to no 
investor protection) to 10 (greater investor protection). 
World Bank indicator 
Rule of Law (RULEOFLAW) The index measures the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence. Values vary from 0 (non-existent) to 100 (excellent). 
World Bank indicator 
Government effectiveness 
(GOVEFECT) 
The index which ranges from 0 to 100 measures the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures. 
World Bank indicator 
GDP per capita (LOGGDP) Logarithm of per capita GDP in US dollars. World Bank indicator 
Organisational Ethical Infrastructure (OEI) 
 
Bribery and corruption training (BCT) Does the company train its employees on the prevention of 
corruption and bribery? 1 if yes, otherwise 0. 
SOCODP008 
Explicit commitments to business ethics 
(ECBI) 
Does the company have appropriate communication tools (whistle 
blower, ombudsman, suggestion box, ethics hotline, newsletter, 
website, etc.) to improve general business ethics? 1 if yes, 
otherwise 0. 
SOCODP0101 
Skills (SKILL) The percentage of board members who have either an industry-
specific background or a strong financial background.  
CGBSO04S 
Internal Corporate Governance and Financial Performance (ICGFP) 
 
Board size (BSIZE) The total number of board members at the end of the fiscal year. CGBSDP060 
Non-executive directors (NEDs) Percentage of non-executive board members. CGBSO06V 
Number of board meetings (NBM) The number of board meetings during the year. CGBFDP024 
Gender diversity (GD) Percentage of women on the board of directors. CGBSO17V 
Total senior executives’ compensation 
(TSEC) 
Logarithm of the total compensation paid to all senior executives 
(if total aggregate is reported by the company). 
CGCPDP054 
Single largest/biggest shareholder/owner 
(SBO) 
The percentage ownership of the single largest/biggest owner (by 
voting power) having shares ownership ≥ 5%. 
CGSRDP045 
Audit committee independence (ACI) Percentage of non-executive board member on the audit 
committee. 
CGBFDP018 
Profit warnings (PW12) 1 if a firm has issued a profit warning in the year before the 
scandal, otherwise 0. ECSLDP059 
Profit warnings (PW13) 1 if a firm has issued a profit warning during the defect year, 
otherwise 0. ECSLDP059 
Loss in the defect year (LOSS) 1 if the company has reported loss in the year of scandal, otherwise 
0. 
 
Costs of corporate scandals (CCS) All real or estimated penalties, fines from lost court cases, 
settlements or cases not yet settled regarding these scandals linked 
to business ethics in general, political contributions or bribery and 
corruption. 
SOCODP059 
Control Variables 
  
Leverage (LEVER) A firm's total debt divided by its total assets. WC03255/WC02999 
Market-to-book value (MTBV) This is defined as the market value of the ordinary (common) 
equity divided by the balance sheet value of the ordinary 
(common) equity. 
MTBV 
Dual (DUAL) 1 if chairman and CEO are the same person, 0 otherwise. CGBSO09V 
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Table 5 Industrial composition of the sample firms 
Industry name No. of companies  % 
Aerospace/Defence 11 4.35 
Air Freight/Courier Services 1 0.40 
Airline Services 1 0.40 
Automobiles/Auto Parts 4 1.58 
Banking Services 44 17.39 
Beverages 2 0.79 
Biotechnology/Medical Research 3 1.19 
Biotechnology/Pharmaceuticals 15 5.93 
Chemicals 1 0.40 
Coal 2 0.79 
Commercial Services/Supplies 6 2.37 
Communications Equipment 1 0.40 
Construction/Engineering/Materials  7 2.77 
Electric Utilities 5 1.98 
Energy-Related Equipment/Services 7 2.77 
Food/Drug Retailing 4 1.58 
Food/Tobacco 10 3.95 
Gas Utilities 2 0.79 
Healthcare Equipment/Supplies 4 1.58 
Healthcare Providers/Services 6 2.37 
Hotels/Entertainment Services 6 2.37 
Household Goods 2 0.79 
Industrial Conglomerates 8 3.16 
Insurance 23 9.09 
Investment Services 11 4.35 
Machinery/Equipment/Components 6 2.37 
Media/Publishing 7 2.77 
Metal/Mining 11 4.35 
Oil and Gas 17 6.72 
Personal/Household Products/Services 3 1.19 
Rails/Roads Transportation 1 0.40 
Real Estate Operations 1 0.40 
Retailers – Diversified 3 1.19 
Retailers – Specialty 2 0.79 
Semiconductors/Semiconductor Equipment 2 0.79 
Software/IT Services 3 1.19 
Telecommunications Services 11 4.35 
Total 253 100 
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Note: Definitions of the variables are reported in Table 4 
 
 
Table 6 Univariate (mean) comparisons of companies having scandals and control sample of matched-
pairs for the defect year 2013 
Variables 
 
Observations 
Firms having 
scandals 
Control 
sample 
p-value for 
difference 
Internal Corporate Governance and Financial Performance (ICGFP) 
BSIZE 497 12.30435 10.63934 <0.001 
NEDs 497 81.21787 78.46889 0.0316 
NBM 477 9.995951 8.83913 0.0051 
GD 497 17.75802 14.12119 0.0001 
SBO 427 16.27077 20.74534 0.013 
TSEC 468 7.345119 7.073186 <0.001 
ACI 502 99.3083 98.59438 0.1469 
PW12 492 0.4347826 0.1818182 <0.001 
LOSS 506 0.1225296 0.0671937 0.0337 
Organisational Ethical Infrastructure (OEI) 
BCT 506 0.7272727 0.4347826 <0.001 
ECBI 505 0.8695652 0.7579365 0.0012 
SKILL 505 43.99631 49.85253 0.0159 
Control variables     
LEVER 506 0.2354032 0.247459 0.4107 
DUAL 506 0.4071146 0.3320158 0.0804 
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Table 7 Correlation matrix 
  OEV BSIZE NEDs NBM GD DUAL SBO TSEC ACI BCT ECBI LEVER PW12 LOSS REGQUA SIPI  SKILL MTBV 
OEV 1.00                  
BSIZE 0.25 1.00                 
NEDs 0.10 0.07 1.00                
NBM 0.13 -0.05 -0.01 1.00               
GD 0.17 0.14 0.27 0.05 1.00              
DUAL 0.08 -0.05 0.30 -0.10 -0.02 1.00             
SBO -0.12 0.11 -0.17 0.01 -0.16 -0.16 1.00            
TSEC 0.28 0.16 0.29 -0.06 0.16 0.21 -0.38 1.00           
ACI 0.06 0.10 0.25 -0.02 0.16 0.14 -0.08 0.28 1.00          
BCT 0.30 0.18 0.09 0.03 0.21 0.04 -0.06 0.29 0.11 1.00         
ECBI 0.14 -0.06 0.35 0.00 0.13 0.16 -0.14 0.39 0.09 0.23 1.00        
LEVER -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.00       
PW12 0.27 0.10 0.20 -0.03 0.18 0.04 -0.13 0.30 0.09 0.24 0.21 0.04 1.00      
LOSS 0.09 -0.05 0.04 0.16 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.06 1.00     
REGQUA 0.01 -0.10 0.12 0.07 0.27 -0.01 -0.38 0.41 0.18 0.13 0.19 -0.12 0.11 -0.04 1.00    
SIPI 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.14 -0.09 -0.10 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.22 1.00   
SKILL -0.11 -0.29 -0.17 0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.13 -0.03 -0.12 -0.18 -0.03 0.07 0.09 1.00  
MTBV -0.11 0.43 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 1.00 
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              Table 8 The impact of country-level and firm-level factors on Organisational Ethical Vulnerability 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
ExCItE Variables           
REGQUA -0.0246*** -0.0248*** -0.0249***   -0.0160* -0.0245***   -0.0262*** 
 (0.00680) (0.00685) (0.00687)   (0.00859) (0.00680)   (0.00685) 
SIPI 0.0336 -0.00639 -0.000429 -0.0297 -0.0679 0.0334 0.156 -0.0105 0.0159 0.0342 
 (0.103) (0.100) (0.100) (0.0990) (0.102) (0.102) (0.125) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) 
RULEOFLAW    -0.0202***     -0.0216**  
    (0.00677)     (0.0101)  
GOVEFFECT        -0.0287**   
 
LOGGDP 
     
-1.123*** 
(0.29) 
  (0.0117)   
OEI Variables           
BCT 0.380** 0.426*** 0.434*** 0.417*** 0.306* 0.384** 0.380** 0.383** 0.394**  
 (0.158) (0.155) (0.155) (0.155) (0.159) (0.157) (0.158) (0.156) (0.155)  
ECBI 0.0238 0.0605 -0.00170 0.0192 0.0453 0.0119 0.0174 -0.287 -0.234 0.0342 
 (0.223) (0.221) (0.223) (0.221) (0.224) (0.222) (0.222) (1.192) (1.030) (0.222) 
SKILL -0.00317 -0.00445 -0.00475* -0.00462* -0.00305 -0.00307 -0.00319 -0.00241 -0.00252 -0.00321 
 (0.00288) (0.00283) (0.00281) (0.00280) (0.00290) (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00285) (0.00285) (0.00288) 
ICGFP Variables 
BSIZE 
 
0.0578** 
 
0.0558** 
 
0.0566** 
 
0.0604** 
 
0.0532** 
 
0.0573** 
 
0.0581** 
 
0.0580** 
 
0.0593** 
 
0.0583** 
 (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0239) (0.0239) (0.0244) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0241) 
NED -0.0113 -0.0107 -0.0103 -0.00917 -0.00898     -0.0113 
 (0.00692) (0.00687) (0.00685) (0.00681) (0.00697)     (0.00693) 
NBM 0.0410** 0.0390** 0.0358** 0.0323* 0.0465*** 0.0409** 0.0414** 0.0375** 0.0353** 0.0409** 
 (0.0177) (0.0174) (0.0175) (0.0173) (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0176) 
GD 0.0117 0.0110 0.0140* 0.0126* 0.0119 0.0116 0.0114 0.00960 0.00887 0.0118 
 (0.00759) (0.00757) (0.00752) (0.00747) (0.00760) (0.00760) (0.00757) (0.00751) (0.00749) (0.00760) 
DUAL 0.0920 0.0777 0.0924 0.152 0.173 0.0872 0.0908 0.0762 0.0793 0.0980 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.162) (0.161) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.156) (0.155) (0.162) 
SBO -0.00896** -0.00886** -0.00871* -0.00887** -0.00872* -0.00872* -0.00888** -0.00766* -0.00802* -0.00875* 
 (0.00452) (0.00443) (0.00445) (0.00448) (0.00451) (0.00450) (0.00451) (0.00443) (0.00446) (0.00451) 
TSEC 0.839*** 0.914*** 1.018*** 0.910*** 0.998*** 0.833*** 0.841*** 0.788*** 0.712*** 0.830*** 
 (0.219) (0.218) (0.222) (0.213) (0.232) (0.218) (0.219) (0.215) (0.209) (0.219) 
ACI -0.000977 -0.00220 -0.00425 -0.00736 0.00169 -0.00179 -0.00153 -0.00599 -0.00826 -3.14e-05 
 (0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0139) 
PW12 0.566***    0.581*** 0.564*** 0.565*** 0.540*** 0.541*** 0.573*** 
 (0.165)    (0.166) (0.165) (0.165) (0.164) (0.163) (0.164) 
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PW13  0.318*         
  (0.172)         
LOSS   0.477* 0.457*       
   (0.254) (0.252)       
Control Variables           
LEVER -0.501 -0.455 -0.509 -0.400 -0.544 -0.507 -0.503 -0.451 -0.396 -0.505 
 (0.461) (0.458) (0.464) (0.458) (0.464) (0.461) (0.461) (0.458) (0.455) (0.460) 
MTBV 0.00902 0.00949 0.00846 0.00838 0.00920 0.00900 0.00899 0.00947 0.00874 0.00904 
 (0.00932) (0.00923) (0.00895) (0.00889) (0.00930) (0.00934) (0.00932) (0.00941) (0.00939) (0.00931) 
DUAL 0.0920 0.0777 0.0924 0.152 0.173 0.0872 0.0908 0.0762 0.0793 0.0980 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.162) (0.161) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.156) (0.155) (0.162) 
Interaction variables           
NED*REGQUA      -0.000117     
      (7.93e-05)     
NED*SIPI       -0.00170    
       (0.00105)    
ECBI*GOVEFFEC        0.00316   
        (0.0137)   
ECBI*RULEOFLAW         0.00253  
         (0.0119)  
BCT*REGQUA          0.00409** 
          (0.00183) 
Constant -4.390** -4.434** -4.971*** -4.191** -1.804 -5.094*** -5.174*** -3.700** -3.727** -4.288** 
 (1.783) (1.773) (1.775) (1.776) (1.838) (1.802) (1.811) (1.806) (1.781) (1.792) 
Observations 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 377 
Pseudo R2 0.1980 0.1817 0.1820 0.1731 0.2084 0.1970 0.1978 0.1903 0.1852 0.1965 
Table 8 reports results from the probit regression analysis. The dependent variable is Organisational Ethical Vulnerability (OEV) – it equals to 1 if a company has a scandal published in media linked to business 
ethics in general, political contributions or bribery and corruption, as defined in Table 2. The main sample includes 253 listed firms, whereas the control sample also includes 253 matched-pairs, from 28 different 
countries. In Model 1, financial performance is measured by using a dummy variable, PW12, which is equal to 1 if a firm has issued a profit warning in the year before the scandal, and 0 otherwise. Model 1 also 
includes two country-level governance mechanisms (regulation quality and strength of investor’s protection index). In Model 2, an alternative explanatory variable for financial performance is PW13, which is equal 
to 1 if a firm has issued a profit warning during the defect year – the year of corporate scandal. Model 3 includes another alternative measure for financial performance, measured by LOSS, which equals to 1 if a 
firm has reported losses during the defect year, and 0 otherwise. Model 4 includes World Bank indicator on rule of law and Model 5 includes the logarithm of per capita GDP. Model 6 includes interaction variable 
NED*REGQUAL, which is an interaction term between country-level governance (Regulation quality) and firm-level governance (NEDs). Model 7 includes NED*SIPI, measured by the interaction between 
country-level governance indicator (strength of investor protection index) and firm-level governance (NEDs). Model 8 includes country-level governance indicator on government effectiveness and the interaction 
variable (ECBI*GOVEFFEC) indicating the interaction between government effectiveness and firm-level commitment to business ethics (ECBI). Model 9 includes country-level indicator (rule of law) and interaction 
variable (ECBI*RULEOFLAW) representing the interaction between the quality of a country’s legal system and firm-specific explicit commitment to business ethics (ECBI). Model 10 includes BCT*REGQUAL, 
which represents the interaction between country-level regulation quality and the provision of firm-level bribery and corruption training programmes (BCT).
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Table 9 Robustness test with instrumental variables 
Variables IV-Probit Marginal effects 
   
BSIZE 0.226*** 0.0194 
 (0.0417)  
NEDs -0.0106 -0.00321 
 (0.00835)  
NBM 0.0382** 0.0131** 
 (0.0167)  
GD 0.00631 0.00386 
 (0.00728)  
DUAL 0.137 0.0301 
 (0.154)  
SBO -0.0127*** -0.00315 
 (0.00454)  
LOGTSEC    0.323*** 0.245 
 (0.08433)  
ACI -0.00510 -0.000176 
 (0.0122)  
BCT 0.166*** 0.137 
 (0.0617)  
ECBI 0.292 0.0152 
 (0.209)  
LEVER -0.236 -0.152 
 (0.388)  
PW12 0.487*** 0.190 
 (0.152)  
REGQUA -0.0118*** -0.00803 
 (0.00528)  
SKILL 0.00313 -0.000855 
 (0.00327)  
Constant -3.386**  
 (1.384)  
   
Observations 378  
Marginal effects are calculated for Model 1 using the partial derivative of outcome probability with respect to the difference variable, 
evaluated at the other difference variable means. Marginal effects measure the percentage of likelihood to engage in unethical activities. 
Endnotes 
1  The laws governing corporate behaviour such as anti-bribing legislation might have ethical motivation.  
2   https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/scandal  
3 Broadly, in corporate governance literature corporate reporting constitutes an important element that enhances 
transparency. We do not cover corporate reporting in this study; however, Chen and Roberts (2010) argue about the 
overlaps in these theories and discuss legitimacy and institutional theories in the corporate governance context, which is 
relevant to our search for factors that may explain organisational ethical vulnerability. 
4  The application of panel data was not an appropriate option in this investigation because the scandals were not repetitive 
in subsequent years and appropriate matched firms were also not available. Thus, by using a strict matching criterion, 
control firms were chosen from the same industry, country and of similar size. 
 
 
